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Non-technical summary  
Contracting out of placement services was introduced in Germany in 2002 to make 
placement services for unemployed individuals more effective and efficient and thereby 
reduce frictional unemployment. In principle, a system of private providers can lead to better 
quality and cost efficiency in placement services by allowing flexibility and introducing 
competition as well as success based compensation. The government remains the financier 
and has management and policy control over the type and quality of services to be provided. 
On the basis of contracts between public job centers and private providers, public 
caseworkers choose unemployed individuals to send to the private providers who, in turn, try 
to match the individuals with suitable employment. The remuneration paid to the providers 
depends mainly on their success rate in placement. 
The empirical part of this paper analyzes the use of this instrument and its effectiveness from 
the perspective of the unemployed individuals assigned to a private provider for the 
complete placement activities, i.e. all the activities necessary to place him in a job. The 
selectivity of the assignments is taken into account in the microeconometric evaluation study 
that uses propensity score matching to solve the evaluation problem. The plausibility of the 
identifying conditional independence assumption is discussed. The highly informative 
administrative data provided by the Federal Employment Agency minimizes selection on 
unobservables, so the matched control group is a reliable proxy for the unobserved 
counterfactual. It is argued that unobserved heterogeneity is small enough to get a negligible 
bias.  
The estimated effect of the assignment to private providers on the probability of employment 
is small and negative: 2.3 to 2.6 percentage points after 2 months. The positive effects on the 
probability of unemployment are even bigger, up to 7 percentage points. The effects are only 
temporary, vanishing after some months. On average, the private providers were less 
successful in placing their clients than the public employment offices at the beginning of 
2004. This might be explained by deficits in the contract management. The design of the 
tender allowed providers who combined low quality with a low price to be awarded the 
contracts. Information mechanisms did not seem to be effective and the incentive effect of 
the payment was rather small. The results show a positive relationship between the amount 
of the premium and the estimated treatment effect. However, establishing a causal 
relationship is problematic because the amount of the payment results from a tender and 
hence is endogenous. A valid instrumental variable for the premium to control this 
endogeneity is not available for 2004. 
Based on the results of this microeconometric evaluation the conclusion is that there should 
be modifications in the contracting out of placement services relative to the design of 2004. 
Given the theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence, the design of the tender 
process and the compensation scheme are starting points for these changes. 
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1 Introduction 
The contracting out of placement services for unemployed individuals is a subject of 
discussion in many OECD countries today. The objectives of such a step are an increase in 
the effectiveness of services, i.e. faster placement of clients, and cost savings. This is meant 
to be achieved by introducing competition into the industry and installing performance based 
competition. Furthermore, private providers are more flexible than the agencies of the former 
public monopolist, the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). Theoretical 
considerations suggest that whether contracting out actually raises the effectiveness of 
placement services depends crucially on the contract management. The coexistence of public 
placement services and the selection into the program must also be kept in mind. 
Up to now, only two countries have contracted out their placement services completely: 
Australia (Dockery and Stromback 2001) and the Netherlands (OECD, 2003, Struyven and 
Steurs, 2004). If the whole system is changed as in these two countries, it is difficult to 
evaluate the consequences of such a reform. A before-after estimator has the disadvantage 
that it is biased by changes in the overall state of the economy. There are no untreated 
individuals in the same country that can be used to build a control group. A control group in 
another country is problematic in that all other country-specific developments have to be 
filtered out. In contrast to this, if only a part of the placement services is contracted out, as in 
Germany, it is possible to examine the effectiveness of this tool by means of a 
microeconometric evaluation. Even though the estimated treatment effect is different from 
that which we would expect in the case of a complete system change, this is a useful piece of 
additional insight. 
Job placement in Germany was a public monopoly until 1994. Regulation was partly 
loosened then but still remained strict in comparison with more deregulated markets in Great 
Britain or the Netherlands (Konle-Seidl and Walwei, 2002). With rising unemployment 
figures in Germany, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal Employment Agency was 
increasingly questioned in the late nineties. Because a large share of its some 90.000 
employees worked in administrative jobs and only a small proportion directly as 
caseworkers for the unemployed, the ratio of caseworkers to unemployed individuals was 
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about 1:600-800 in 2002 (Hartz-Kommission, 2002).1 One instrument to draw on private 
placement agencies for the placement of unemployed persons is the job placement voucher, 
introduced in 2002. The voucher seems to have positive direct effects on the users (see 
Pfeiffer and Winterhager, 2006a, Winterhager et al. 2006). Also in 2002, the government 
started to contract out placement services to private providers. From January to September 
2004, 8 percent of the people who registered as unemployed were assigned to a private 
provider for complete placement activities, i.e. all the activities necessary to place him in a 
job. 
This paper presents the results of a microeconometric evaluation of assignments of 
unemployed individuals to private providers in Germany in the first quarter of 2004.2 The 
analysis provides new insight into how effective it is to contract out placement services. 
Theoretical discussions identify the key factors for successful contracting out: careful 
selection of the private providers and the implementation of governance mechanisms to 
avoid moral hazard. A theoretical analysis can thus identify the potential for improvements, 
but it cannot tell whether a given design of the contracting scheme is actually more effective 
compared to a pure public provision of the service. The only possibility is to look at the data. 
With a rich administrative data set provided by the Federal Employment Agency a matching 
approach is implemented to estimate the average effect of treatment on the treated. 
Treatment is defined as approaching a private agency which tries to place the person 
assigned to them. The treatment effects are estimated by nearest neighbor propensity score 
matching with replacement. 
The most important results of the paper are the following: The estimated effect of 
assignment to a private provider on the probability of employment is small and negative. The 
employment probability of an unemployed individual who is assigned is reduced by 2.3 to 
2.6 percentage points after 2 months. The positive effects on the probability of 
unemployment are even bigger, up to 7 percentage points. The effects vanish after some 
months which is in line with the assignment duration of three months. Overall, the private 
                                                 
1  However, it has to be kept in mind that these figures were produced by the administration itself and might 
be politically motivated. 
2  The evaluation study was financed by the Institute for Employment Research of the German Federal 
Employment Agency; IAB-Projekt 544a „Begleitforschung zur Vermittlung – Implementation und 
Evaluierung von Beauftragungen nach § 37(a) SGB III, Vermittlungsgutscheinen und PSA“, also see 
Kruppe (2006). 
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providers were not more successful in placing their clients than the public employment 
offices in the beginning of 2004. Furthermore, there seems to be a positive relationship 
between the amount of the success-based payment and the estimated treatment effect, hinting 
at the crucial role of the incentive mechanism. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a detailed description of the 
system of contracting out in Germany as regulated in § 37 SGB III (code of social law). 
Following new institutional economics, marketability as a precondition for contracting out is 
discussed as well as the design of the contract management. Section 3 describes the 
administrative data set provided by the Federal Employment Agency as well as the samples 
used for the analysis; Section 4 presents descriptive statistics for the instrument. The 
methodology and the identifying assumptions of the matching approach are discussed in 
Section 5. The average treatment effect on the treated is estimated by propensity score 
matching. Section 6 reports the empirical results and Section 7 concludes. 
2  Institutional details and theoretical considerations 
2.1 Institutional framework for contracting out  
As in many other European countries, job placement used to be a public monopoly in 
Germany, until the early 1990s. It was only in 1994 that the government permitted private 
job placement. But regulation still remained strict in comparison with much more 
deregulated markets in Great Britain and the Netherlands (Buttler and Walwei 1995, Konle-
Seidl and Walwei 2002). 
At the beginning of 2002 the government introduced outsourcing of placement tasks in § 37a 
SGB III (nowadays § 37).3 In 2002, the selection of external providers was realized on a 
discretionary basis in local public employment offices (Konle-Seidl, 2005). In 2003, the 
implementation of § 37 SGB III was modified so that the placement tasks were tendered on a 
central level and the payments more incentive-oriented. Due to these changes, real 
contracting out of placement tasks was implemented in 2003. Further modifications to the 
implementation were carried out in the following years. Since the study concentrates on 
2004 for reasons of data availability, the institutional setup for that year will be described in 
detail now. 
                                                 
3  To avoid confusion, we will talk of § 37 from now on.  
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§ 37 SGB III regulates the contracting out of placement tasks to private providers. There are 
three types of tasks contracted out:  
- the complete placement activities for a jobseeker or a person looking for basic job 
training; these are all the activities which aim at placing the person within a job or 
job training 
- parts of the placement activities for a jobseeker or a person looking for basic job 
training (e.g. profiling) 
- acquisition of vacancies for undetermined jobseekers or persons looking for basic job 
training. 
Since the objective is to investigate the effects on individual employment probabilities, the 
acquisition of vacancies is not considered. The second type of task (e.g. profiling, case 
management) is also omitted here because it was cut back as early as in 2004 and was 
completely dropped at the beginning of 2006. The paper therefore concentrates on the first 
type, which is directly aimed at integrating an individual into employment. Concerning the 
target group, the focus of the paper is on unemployed jobseekers. 
After a tender (described below) the local public employment office makes a contract with a 
private provider. In this contract the public employment office commits to assigning a 
certain number of jobseekers4 to the provider during a certain period (contract period). The 
provider has to accomplish exactly one of the tasks mentioned above for these jobseekers. 
He is given a certain time to do this for every single jobseeker (assignment period). In the 
case of complete placement activities, the assignment period is usually 3 months but can be 
prolonged if the integration of a jobseeker seems difficult. 
The compensation of the provider is incentive oriented. In case of successful integration of 
the jobseeker into employment during the assignment period5 a premium is paid, the 
absolute amount of which is determined in the tender. For employment that lasts for more 
than six months, a bonus will be paid after these six months (the same amount as the 
premium). These rules are the same for all jobseekers. In addition, for jobseekers who have 
been unemployed for more than 6 months, a lump sum is paid after the jobseeker has called 
on the provider for the first time. The amount depends on the duration of previous 
                                                 
4  There are usually certain types of job seekers defined, e.g. a certain age group or unemployment duration. 
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unemployment: 15 percent of the premium in case of unemployment that lasted between 6 
and 12 months and 25 percent for unemployment for more than a year. The private provider 
has to give a formal account of its efforts for each single unemployed person in order to 
receive the payments. 
Jobseekers who have been unemployed for more than six months have the right to be 
assigned to a private provider. But caseworkers in the public employment offices can also 
assign the short term unemployed to a provider. If the caseworker wants to assign a 
jobseeker to a provider, the jobseeker can refuse if he can provide a reasonable justification 
such as, e.g., a case for nursing care in the family which prevents him from entering the 
assignment. If the jobseeker refuses the assignment without justification, this should lead to 
revision of his benefit entitlement.  
As mentioned above, contracts are awarded to private providers after a central tender. All 
providers with the necessary qualifications are taken into consideration. The provider who 
offers the lowest premium is awarded the contract. The bonus and, where applicable, the 
lump sum are determined by the premium in the described way. 
In 2004, in addition to the contracts described so far, some contracts awarded in 2003 were 
still valid and had to be fulfilled by the public employment offices. Part of these contracts 
also comprised the complete placement activities. The main difference from the new 
contracts was that the compensation structure could be defined by the local offices and thus 
was more diverse than in the standardized contracts of 2004. The assignments governed by 
these contracts comprising complete placement activities are included in the 
microeconometric evaluation. The treatment is very similar and more variation is added to 
the compensation structure which can be exploited in the econometric analysis. A check is 
also carried out to establish whether the treatment effect of these old contracts differs from 
the one of the new contracts. 
2.2 Theoretical background 
When analyzing placement services for unemployed persons, first one has to ask if a 
government intervention can be justified at all. Is there a market failure? Four problems can 
be identified. First, there are information asymmetries between the unemployed, possible 
employers and placement agencies. Second, placement services can have important 
                                                                                                                                                      
5  It must not be a temporary employment contract with a duration of less than three months. 
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externalities with respect to the unemployment insurance system. Third, there might be 
credit restrictions for unemployed persons who cannot pay for placement services 
themselves. Fourth, more recent literature suggests that in the presence of time inconsistent 
preferences (hyperbolic discounting) policies for unemployed workers can represent a Pareto 
improvement (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). These matters cannot be discussed here in 
detail, but usually authors come to the conclusion that some kind of government intervention 
is necessary (e.g. Kretschmer, 2005, p. 129ff.; Heidinger, 2002, p. 92ff.). Next, one should 
ask whether it is more effective and efficient if the government provides this service itself or 
if it contracts it out to private providers.6 
The minimum requirement for contracting out of placement services is fulfilled, because the 
service is marketable (see Bruttel, 2005): 
- The investment specificity (see Williamson, 1985) of the service is not too high. 
Countries like Australia and the Netherlands have shown that know-how in 
placement services for less qualified unemployed individuals can be built up in a 
rather short time. Even though until recently only 2 percent of job matches in 
Germany were arranged by private agencies (Kettner and Spitznagel 2005), there are 
many private firms, e.g. from the training sector, that can enter the market. So 
structures from which private placement can develop exist and it is possible to make 
the market contestable (see Baumol, 1982; Martin, 1993).  
- Hart et al. (1997) argue that public services should only be delivered by private 
providers if the contractual obligations can be laid down in sufficiently exact terms 
and if compliance can be ensured. In placement services for the unemployed, it is 
particularly important that the quality of services is assured for all individuals. In 
principle, this is possible. 
Whether contracting out increases the effectiveness of the service will depend on the 
contract management. The contract management involves the issues of selecting the private 
providers and implementing effective governance mechanisms. The selection of the private 
providers is important because screening can prevent adverse selection. For § 37 the 
selection is conducted by means of centralized tenders as described above. In 2004, there 
was only a minimum qualification level required for the private providers to be able to bid in 
                                                 
6  The following theoretical approaches are sometimes summarized in the literature under the label new 
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the tender. Apart from this minimum requirement, the quality of the provider did not play a 
role. The contract was awarded on the basis of the lowest price offered. One would not 
expect such a selection process to be sufficient to avoid adverse selection. To the contrary, 
those providers that combine a low price with low quality will be awarded the contracts. 
This seems to be confirmed by a survey of experts in 50 local public employment offices 
(sinus, 2006). 60 percent of them reported that in the (centralized) tender private contracts 
were awarded to providers whom they would not have considered appropriate because of a 
lack of qualification.  
The second issue of contract management is the implementation of governance mechanisms 
to avoid moral hazard. This is the subject of the principal agent theory. In a situation of 
information asymmetries and incomplete contracts, moral hazard means the increased risk of 
problematical (immoral) behavior, and thus a negative outcome, because the agent who 
causes the problem does not suffer the full (or any) consequences. There are three 
governance mechanisms to reduce moral hazard: incentive mechanisms, information 
mechanisms and control mechanisms (Bruttel, 2005). Information mechanisms include 
performance measurement and are aimed at reducing the information asymmetry between 
principal and agent. Control mechanisms imply that the provision of service is regulated, 
which leads to a loss of flexibility. § 37 combines an incentive mechanism (performance 
based compensation) and an information mechanism (formal report of the provider on the 
efforts for each assigned individual). However, due to the high work load in the public 
employment agencies, the reports were usually not checked very carefully in 2004. The 
performance of the private providers did not play a role in later tenders.  
The incentive mechanism depends on the amount of the premium in case of placement and 
the bonus after six months of employment. Yet this amount was not fixed but instead 
emerged in the tender. As described above, the design of the tender was such that low 
premiums could be expected. And this was actually what happened, as will be shown in the 
next section. These rather low premiums meant the incentives for the providers to invest 
efforts into placement activities for the persons assigned to them were small. 
Even though some deficits in the contract management for the contracting out regulated by § 
37 in Germany in 2004 have been identified, it is not clear from a theoretical perspective if 
the assignment of unemployed individuals has negative individual effects. This is because it 
                                                                                                                                                      
institutional economics. For an introduction see Furubotn and Richter (1998). 
8   
is possible that the public provision of services is less effective. This has to be tested in the 
empirical part. 
3 Data 
The data used for the empirical analysis originate from the Federal Employment Agency. It 
was not until January 2004 that an IT system was installed to systematically control the use 
of contracting out according to § 37. For this reason earlier use of the instrument cannot be 
evaluated. The system stores each jobseeker who is assigned to a private provider. In 
addition the start and end dates of the assignment are registered, as well as which type of 
task has to be accomplished by the provider, the structure and the amount of the determined 
compensation, and when the jobseeker called on the provider for the first time, if at all. Data 
until September 2004 are available for this study. The data can be linked with other 
individual data from the Federal Employment Agency described below (see also Hujer et al., 
2004, Lechner et al., 2001). 
From the jobseeker’s data base (BewA), which contains spell data for all the unemployed 
persons registered with a public employment agency, a lot of information on the individuals 
can be drawn: socio-economic characteristics, qualifications, recent labor market history and 
information about their desired job. To get more information on the long term labor market 
history of each individual, the newly created integrated employment biographies (IEB) data 
base is used (Hummel et al., 2005). This data set contains spell data from four different 
sources: the above-mentioned BewA, the data bases on regular employment (BeH), on 
benefits paid by the Federal Employment Agency to the unemployed (LeH) and on labor 
market programs the individuals participate in (MTG). The IEB was created to evaluate the 
labor market policy reforms introduced in Germany since 2004 (the so-called Hartz 
reforms). As argued below, the exact data on the employment history are very useful to 
reduce unobserved heterogeneity between the individuals. The IEB is also needed to 
measure the integration into regular employment after the assignment.7 In general, the data 
can only be used after careful validations and corrections (described in Heinze et al., 2005). 
                                                 
7  Actually the standard IEB data had to be supplemented by employment data for 2004. At the time when 
these data were supplied for this study, their degree of completeness was only 80 to 90 percent. This is 
because employment data have to be reported by employers to the department of social security. As there is 
no reason to assume that the incompleteness of the data is related to the treatment, the employment shares 
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The time frame for the econometric analysis is narrow. As stated above, no reliable data 
existed on the use of the instrument before 2004. Furthermore, data on regular employment 
were only available until the end of 2004. This leads to the following strategy: a sample of 
the assignments in the first quarter of 2004 is used, so that the observation of nine months 
after the assignment date is possible. For the premium to be paid under the standardized 
contracts, employment must start during the assignment period of three months. The bonus is 
paid after six months of employment, so this event is also included in the observation period 
for the sample. After all the data validations, 43,526 assignments can be used in this sample.8  
4 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 shows the development of the assignments from January to September 2004. The 
total number of assignments per month does not vary much. But this number also contains 
assignments due to contracts comprising only partial placement tasks. This paper 
concentrates on the contracts described in Section 2, which comprise the complete placement 
activities. In Figure 1 it becomes evident that their number rises in the first months of the 
year, peaks at some 36,000 in April and falls back to about 26,000 in September. Altogether 
during these nine months about 250,000 jobseekers were assigned to a provider for complete 
placement activities, or 8 percent of the people who registered as unemployed during that 
time. 
Thus the instrument reached only a limited number of unemployed persons in 2004. The 
small use of the instrument is also reflected in its costs: for the assignments for complete 
placement activities during the first half of 2004, Pfeiffer and Winterhager (2006b) calculate 
average costs of about 180 €. This would lead to a sum of less than 70 million € for 2004, 
which is small in comparison to the 19.5 billion € spent by the Federal Employment Agency 
on active labor market policies in that year. 
For the analyses, treatment is defined as “approaching a private provider”. This answers the 
question if the private providers work more effective under the given setting. This is slightly 
different from the treatment “being assigned to a private provider”, because some of the 
unemployed who were assigned did not approach the provider. But as the share is less than 5 
                                                                                                                                                      
for participants and non-participants and thus the treatment effect will be underestimated by 10 to 20 
percent. 
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per cent, the difference between the two corresponding treatment effects is small. The date of 
the treatment is chosen as the first approach to the provider. Anticipatory effects due to the 
fact that the assignment takes place before the first approach will be negligible because the 
average time between the two dates is less than a week.  
 
Figure 1: Number of assignments (§ 37 SGB III) from January to September 2005; all assignments, 
assignments for complete placement activities 
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Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
In a dynamic setting, it is necessary to consider which non-participants are included in the 
analysis. One possibility would be to include those persons who are never assigned during 
their unemployment spell. But Sianesi (2004) argues that within the Swedish system an 
unemployed person will join a program at some time, provided that the individual remains 
unemployed long enough. The reason why an unemployed individual is not observed to 
participate in the program is that the person has already found a job or the time horizon of 
the analysis is too short. Consequently, she defines non-participants as those persons who are 
not treated during a given time interval, but who may get the treatment later. This means that 
the estimated treatment effect compares “treatment today” to “later treatment or no 
treatment”. This approach is followed here because of the short time horizon of the analysis. 
The fact that only a small part of the unemployed individuals is assigned means that the 
difference between the two definitions is negligible. 
                                                                                                                                                      
8  Winterhager (2006) uses a broader sample of 103,424 assignments in the first half of the year, for which 
only six months of employment outcome can be observed. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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Excluded from the control group are participants in other active labor market programs at the 
reference date (like retraining or job creation schemes) and recipients of job placement 
vouchers.9 This means that we measure the effect of the assignment versus using the 
placement services of the Federal Employment Agency without participating in any labor 
market program. Otherwise our estimated effect would be influenced by the effect of other 
programs. However, individuals who participated in such programs later on are not 
excluded. Thus, we implicitly view these policies as one possible consequence of being or 
not being assigned.10 
The characteristics of the assigned unemployed and the others are compared in Table 1. 
Analyses were conducted separately for eastern and western Germany, as the two regions 
still feature very different labor markets. It becomes evident that the caseworkers assign the 
unemployed in a selective way. The participants are six to seven years younger on average. 
Foreigners and married persons are underrepresented and, in eastern Germany, females. 
Especially in western Germany, the share of persons without complete vocational training is 
smaller among the assigned unemployed. Finally, their previous unemployment duration is 
more than four months shorter in western Germany and more than five months shorter in 
eastern Germany. Altogether, looking at these observable characteristics of both groups, one 
would conclude that the caseworkers tend to send individuals with better employment 
opportunities to the private providers. 
There is considerable variation between the labor market districts regarding the use of 
private providers. The share of individuals assigned in the first quarter of 2004 lies between 
0 and 9.4 percent. Only a small part of this variation can be explained by the local labor 
market conditions like unemployment rate or number of unemployed per caseworker. Most 
of the variation seems to be caused by the different attitudes towards the instrument in the 
local employment agencies, as reported in a survey with local experts (see sinus 2006). 
 
                                                 
9  This instrument allows individuals unemployed for more than three months to make use of the services of a 
private placement agency; the private agency is rewarded by the public employment office in case of 
successful placement. See Pfeiffer and Winterhager (2006b) and Winterhager et al. (2006) for evaluation 
analyses on the job placement voucher. 
10  This approach is also followed in Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Sianesi (2004). 
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assigned not assigned assigned not assigned
Number 16,126 939,501 27,400 2,261,562
age (years) 34.3 41.4 34.3 40.3
foreign 0.57 % 1.47 % 14.51 % 16.25 %
female 41.97 % 47.84 % 39.63 % 40.39 %
married 32.63 % 49.65 % 36.57 % 48.90 %
health problems (binary) 18.50 % 21.77 % 16.26 % 25.11 %
no school 6.72 % 7.75 % 11.20 % 14.31 %
CSE 29.98 % 30.37 % 49.18 % 52.71 %
O-levels 57.46 % 55.05 % 26.73 % 20.19 %
adv. Technical college entrance 1.65 % 1.69 % 5.92 % 4.63 %
A-levels 4.20 % 5.13 % 6.97 % 8.16 %
without complete training 14.02 % 3.05 % 34.44 % 39.68 %
on-the-job vocational training 69.00 % 7.22 % 53.36 % 47.72 %
classroom vocational training 11.46 % 4.00 % 3.86 % 2.31 %
technical college 2.87 % 4.05 % 4.50 % 4.53 %
university 1.65 % 2.45 % 2.29 % 3.73 %
polytechnic 0.99 % 14.26 % 1.55 % 2.04 %
unskilled employee 30.63 % 37.55 % 42.29 % 49.36 %
skilled employee 63.98 % 54.66 % 50.69 % 41.20 %
technical school level 1.63 % 2.25 % 2.45 % 2.32 %
polytechnic level 1.25 % 1.76 % 1.58 % 2.14 %
university level 1.15 % 2.19 % 1.85 % 3.18 %
top executive 0.01 % 0.02 % 0.04 % 0.05 %
others 0.95 % 1.56 % 1.10 % 1.75 %
existing professional experience in 
desired occupation 69.71 % 82.49 % 78.77 % 85.14 %
daily wage of last employment (€) 19.3 19.7 25.1 25.4
daily amount of unemployment benefits / 
assistance (€) 17.2 15.6 20.2 18.3
duration of unemployment until issue 
(days) 324.3 484.4 253.6 388.0
Table 1: Comparison of unemployed assigned to a private provider from January to March 2004 
and others, selected attributes
East West
general socio-demographic attributes
schooling
vocational training
qualification as seen by the caseworker (reference: no specialized knowledge)
information about working history (short time)
 Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
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An important feature of the instrument is the premium for the private providers which 
constitutes the incentive mechanism of the contract management. As stated in Section 2, the 
premium is not generally fixed but depends on the tender. The amount of the premium in 
case of successful placement is then the same for all individuals assigned within a given 
contract. Table 2 reports the distribution of this premium on the individual level. In more 
than 90 percent of the cases it is below 800 Euro and in more than half of the cases below 
400 Euro. It is higher in western Germany where the general price level is higher as well. 
Compared to the Australian system, these premiums are rather low (see Dockery and 
Stromback, 2001). 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 - 200 7,316 26.7 % 2,992 18,6%
200 - 400 7,864 28.7 % 5,393 33,4%
400 - 800 9,727 35.5 % 6,092 37,8%
 > 800 2,493 9.1 % 1,649 10,2%
27,400 100.0 % 16,126 100.0 %
Table 2: premium in case of successful placement (1. payment)
EastWest
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
The outcome that is of interest for this study is the labor market status in the 9 months after 
the treatment date. Three statuses are observed: “regular employment” without any subsidies 
from the employment office, “subsidized employment” which is partially or completely 
financed by the employment office11 and unemployment. Figure 2 presents the labor market 
status “regular employment” in the 12 months before and the nine months after the treatment 
date, both for assigned individuals and individuals not assigned.12 It becomes evident that in 
the year before the treatment a higher share of the assigned individuals is employed. This 
confirms that a positive selection seems to take place in the assignments. Because of this 
selectivity the higher value of the outcome after the treatment cannot be interpreted as the 
effect of the treatment. The next section will explain how this effect can be estimated. 
 
                                                 
11  Wage subsidies (Eingliederungszuschüsse) are used to support employment on the first labor market, job 
creation schemes (ABM) refer to the second labor market and have to be “additional”. 
12  For the latter group a hypothetical treatment date has to be chosen, see section 5.3. 
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Figure 2: Share of participants (assignment for complete placement activities) and non-participants 
in regular employment 12 months before and 9 months after the assignment date (assignments in the 
first quarter of 2004) 
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
5 Evaluation approach 
The objective of this paper is to find the effect of approaching a private provider (treatment) 
on the individual probability for an unemployed person of entering into regular employment 
within the nine months following (outcome). This is called the evaluation problem.13 In 
Section 5.1, this evaluation problem will be formalized in the potential outcome framework 
and matching is presented as a possible solution. The identifying assumption of this 
approach will be discussed for the contracting out system in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 
describes the implementation of the matching approach. 
5.1 Matching as a solution to the evaluation problem  
The microeconomic evaluation problem can be formalized in the potential outcome 
framework (see Heckman et al., 1999; Lechner und Pfeiffer, 2001). This representation 
requires the stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA, see Rubin, 1980). For this 
assumption to hold, the contracting out system must not have indirect effects. One might 
expect the system to have substitution effects on other unemployed individuals: if private 
providers provide good services, employers will tend to recruit their clients instead of other 
unemployed persons. However, as stated above, only a small share of unemployed 
                                                 
13  For a survey on evaluation methods see Heckman et al. (1999), Blundell and Costa Dias (2002), Angrist 
and Krueger (1999). 
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individuals are actually assigned to private providers, so indirect effects can be ignored and 
the potential outcome framework is applicable. 
Let Di be a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the unemployed person is assigned and 
0 otherwise. Let Yi be the outcome variable which is 1 if the individual is in regular 
employment at a given date. More precisely, Y1i is the outcome in case of assignment and 
Y0i is the outcome in case of no assignment. We are actually interested in the treatment 
effect  
iii YY 01 −=Δ .           (1) 
It is never possible to observe Y1i and Y0i for the same individual at the same time, so iΔ  
cannot be measured directly. This is the fundamental evaluation problem. To be able to 
estimate the treatment effect we have to use identifying assumptions. The parameter of 
interest in most evaluation studies is the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT): 
)1|()1|()1|( 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT .     (2) 
In our setting, this parameter would measure the average change in employment probability 
of the assigned persons that was actually caused by the assignment to the private provider. It 
is not an option to simply take Y1 from the participants (D = 1) and Y0 from the non-
participants (D = 0) because the participants are not a random selection from the pool of 
unemployed individuals. Instead, the caseworker will select the individuals who are suited to 
be assigned and the unemployed individuals will or will not ask to be assigned. If this 
selection is based on criteria that are also correlated with the outcome, this will lead to a 
selection bias:  
 )0|()1|( 00 =≠= DYEDYE .        (3) 
Instead, evaluation methods try to identify )1|( 0 =DYE  by using more data and certain 
identifying assumptions. A set of assumptions under which the ATT can be identified is the 
following: 
XDY |0 ⊥            (4) 
1)|1Pr( <= XD           (5) 
Assumption (4) is called the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). It states that once 
we control for a vector X of observable characteristics, the outcome in case of not being 
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assigned to a private provider, Y0, does not depend on the assignment. This is a critical 
assumption, because all the characteristics which influence assignment and the outcome at 
the same time have to be observed. This assumption will be discussed in detail in Section 
5.2. Assumption (5) is the common support condition. If it does not hold, i.e. 
1)|1Pr( == XD , then there is no individual with characteristics X who is not assigned. In 
this case it is not possible to estimate the counterfactual ),1|( 0 XDYE = , even if assumption 
(4) holds. 
Under assumptions (4) and (5) the counterfactual outcome of the participants (and thus the 
ATT) can in principle be estimated straightforwardly: for a participant with characteristics 
X=x the average outcome of all the non-participants with X=x is a consistent estimate of the 
counterfactual. But in practice, if the dimension of X is large and contains many continuous 
variables, there will be a large number of participants for whom no exact match exists (the 
“curse of dimensionality”, Heckman et al., 1997).   
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove a result which is useful to reduce the dimensionality of 
the problem. They show that if the CIA holds, the following will hold as well: 
( ) ( ))(,0)(,1 XpDYEXpDYE oo === ,       (6) 
where p(X) = Pr(D=1|X), the probability of participation conditional on X, is called the 
propensity score. It is thus not necessary to match on all the covariates, but it is sufficient to 
match on the propensity score. That makes it much easier to find an adequate match for the 
participants. As the propensity score is not observable, it has to be estimated by a parametric 
approach, such as probit. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) show that it is important to choose the 
specification of this estimation carefully in order to balance the covariates. 
A matching estimator takes the form 
( )∑ ∑
= = ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= 1 0
1 1
01
1
,1ˆ
N
i
N
j
ji YjiwYN
α ,        (7) 
where αˆ  is the estimated ATT, N1 and N0 are the numbers of participants and non-
participants, and ( ) [ ]1,0, ∈jiw  are the weights for the non-participants. Different matching 
estimators differ in these weights. In this paper single nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement will be used. That is, for each participant the non-participant who is closest with 
respect to the propensity score is chosen as control person, or formally 
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NN        (8) 
For the calculation of standard errors of the ATT, independent observations, fixed weights 
and homoskedasticity of the outcome variable within the treatment group and the control 
group are assumed (see Lechner, 2001). The variance is influenced by the fact that the 
propensity score is an estimated variable. In order to estimate the standard errors 
consistently, we would have to use bootstrapping (see Lechner, 2002), which is very time-
consuming for our sample. Lechner (2002) shows that in an application for Switzerland there 
is little difference between the bootstrapped variance and that which results from the 
following equation, which assumes that the variance is not influenced by the fact that the 
propensity score is an estimated variable: 
)0|(
)(
)1|(1)( 12
1
1
2
1
1
0
=+==
∑
= DYVar
N
DYVar
N
ATTVar
N
j
jω
.     (9) 
where 1N  is the number of treated individuals and jω  is the weight of observation j in the 
matching. This equation will be used here to calculate the approximate standard errors of the 
ATT. 
5.2 Plausibility of the Matching Assumptions 
For the CIA to be justifiable, we would have to be able to observe all the criteria which 
influence both the individual probability of assignment and the outcome in the case of 
assignment. This assumption has to be discussed in relation to the available data set and the 
selection process. Less than 20 per cent of the unemployed who were assigned asked for the 
assignment on their own initiative. So the caseworker plays the central role in the selection 
process. 
There are several motives for the caseworker to assign an unemployed individual to a private 
provider or not to do so. First, in the directives from the head office of the Federal 
Employment Agency, it is stated that the caseworker should assign an unemployed person if 
this is “reasonable and economic in the concrete individual case”, i.e. if the unemployed 
person benefits from the assignment. Of course, this leaves the case worker with much scope 
for decision. However, it also appears that the caseworker should not assign an unemployed 
person who does not have a chance of finding a job anyway (at least not for the complete 
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placement activities). Second, a caseworker might perceive the private providers as 
competition. For this reason he could assign unemployed individuals with low chances of 
getting a job so that the provider does not succeed in placing them. Third, if the caseworker 
wants to help the unemployed in finding jobs as fast as possible, his decision will depend on 
his personal opinion on the abilities of the private provider. Finally, if he wants to reduce his 
own workload, he will assign a large number of the unemployed. 
This broad range of motives is reflected in a survey among the experts on contracting out 
from 50 local public employment agencies, that also asks which target group is primarily 
assigned to private providers (sinus, 2006). The result is that very different target groups are 
named by the agencies. Furthermore, 70 per cent of the agencies do not think that their 
workload is reduced through the assignments. Considering the possible motives and the 
survey results, there is apparently considerable heterogeneity in the selection process on the 
caseworker level. It is not generally the “good” or the “bad” unemployed who are assigned 
to the private providers. This is in line with the evidence on observable characteristics 
presented in Table 1 and reassuring for the discussion of the CIA.  
The first two motives depend on the caseworker’s assessment of the employment prospects 
of the individual in question. In the matching approach we must control for the variables 
related to this because they will be correlated with the outcome, i.e. employment. The 
caseworker’s assessment of the employment prospects will depend on the observable 
characteristics of the unemployed individual, which can be found in the data: 
- socio-demographic attributes such as gender, age, nationality, marital status, existence of 
infant children and health status  
- the qualification of the unemployed person: school degree, professional training and 
actual qualification level seen by the caseworker; this last variable is an important 
indicator for the caseworker’s assessment of the employment prospects 
- information about the job the jobseeker is looking for: preferred working time, industry 
and whether he has experience in that industry in the assessment of the caseworker 
- the recent labor market history of the unemployed person will be an important signal to 
the caseworker; it is possible to observe the duration of the unemployment, the level of 
unemployment benefits or assistance, the industry, wage and the duration of his last job, 
and if the individual was laid off by his employer, chose to quit or had a fixed term 
contract. 
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But the caseworker’s decision will also depend on his perception of the social competence 
and the motivation of the unemployed individual. These important “soft factors” cannot be 
observed directly. Still, they will be correlated with the observed variables listed above. 
Most of what is left should largely be reflected in the employment history of the unemployed 
person. The employment history was shown to be very important for the identification of the 
causal effect by matching (Heckman et al., 1998). In the data set, there is daily information 
on the status of the individual over the last five years. Possible statuses are employment, 
unemployment, participation in labor market programs (training and job creation schemes) 
and out of the labor force. As the sample is large, this information can be used in a very 
detailed way. 
There should be enough information on the unemployed to be able to approximate all the 
criteria which influence both the participation and the outcome in case of not being assigned. 
Note that more detailed information is available in the data than in other evaluation studies 
that apply matching, e.g. Dorsett (2005) and Heckman and Smith (2004). So the CIA is 
plausible and the average effect of treatment on the treated can be estimated by matching. 
Random variation in the treatment conditional on X, which is needed to achieve common 
support, will result from the differing motives of the caseworkers discussed above insofar as 
they are not related to the outcome for the unemployed individual. 
5.3 Implementation of the matching approach 
 Some of the covariates as well as the outcome variable are measured with respect to the date 
on which assignment takes place. For example, the duration of unemployment before 
assignment is an important covariate; the outcome regular employment is measured 9 
months after the assignment date. However, for the individuals who are not assigned, such a 
starting date does not exist. One possible way around this would be to use one starting date 
for all the non-participants, for example in the middle of the time span analyzed. But that 
would lead to a methodological problem. If all the non-participants had the same starting 
date while the participants had different starting dates, the variables based on these dates 
would not be independent of the participation. 
The problem is accounted for using a method proposed by Lechner (1999) to account for. 
The starting dates for the non-participants are drawn at random from the distribution of 
starting dates of the participants. This generates a distribution of starting dates for the non-
participants which converges to the distribution for the participants. If such a hypothetical 
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starting date does not fit with the institutional framework, i.e. if the non-participant is not 
unemployed at that date, the observation is deleted.14 Furthermore, in the propensity score 
matching the restriction is imposed that only individuals with starting date in the same 
month can be matched. This additional restriction makes the method similar to that of 
Sianesi (2004). The latter, however, requires more time-consuming computations. 
6 Empirical estimates  
6.1 Propensity Score Estimation 
As discussed in Section 5, matching is carried out on the basis of the propensity score. The 
propensity score is estimated by maximizing a likelihood function based on a standard probit 
equation, where – according to the CIA – those variables which should influence both the 
probability of treatment and the outcome in the non-treated state are included. Six sets of 
variables can be distinguished: socio-demographic attributes, qualifications, information 
about the last contact with the labor market, information about the preferred new job, recent 
labor market history and regional indicators. The exact specification was chosen such that the 
variables are balanced well enough (see Section 6.2). Table A1 in the appendix reports the 
estimation results including the more important covariates. The omitted results are available 
upon request or can be found in Kruppe (2006). 
It was already apparent from the descriptive statistics that age is an important determinant for 
the assignments. Age enters the probit estimation as a spline function, so that each variable 
(e.g. “Age 30 - 35”) represents the influence of age in the respective interval. The results 
show that the probability of assignment is by far highest for the youngest individuals. It drops 
sharply approaching age 30, is more or less constant between 30 and 50 years and shows 
another strong decrease at more than 55 years. 
Foreigners have a significantly lower probability of being assigned to a private provider. 
Women living alone have a higher probability of being assigned than single men. Looking at 
the interaction effects of female and marital statuses, it becomes evident that the opposite is 
true for married women and, in eastern Germany, for women living in a partnership without 
                                                 
14  This procedure should not be problematic because the time window is only 3 months for the first sample. 
For the larger sample, the random starting dates are drawn separately for each quarter, i.e. for all the non-
participants unemployed in the second quarter, a random starting date from the individuals assigned in the 
second quarter is drawn. A non-participant unemployed in both quarters can be used as a control two times. 
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being married. When it comes to professional training, individuals with classroom vocational 
training are assigned most often, both for people with and without experience in the desired 
job. Finally, caseworkers are more likely to assign unemployed individuals who receive a 
higher daily amount of benefits or assistance. Overall, these results show that the first of the 
possible motives for the caseworker’s decision (Section 5.2) is most important: they tend to 
assign those individuals for whom a placement seems feasible. 
6.2 Quality of the matching 
The objective of the matching is to balance the covariates that influence both the assignment 
probability and the outcome in case of no assignment. The degree to which this objective is 
achieved can be tested by balancing tests. A test commonly used is the standardized 
difference introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). It is calculated for each covariate 
before and after matching as follows: 
( ) ( ) 2/)()(100;2/)()(100 0011
01
0011
01
XVXV
XXSDIFF
XVXV
XXSDIFF MMafterbefore +
−=+
−= , (10) 
where 1X  and 0X  are the means of the covariate in the samples for participants and non-
participants before matching, MX 1  and MX 0  the means in the matched samples and )( 11 XV  
and )( 00 XV  the variances in the unmatched samples. There is not a critical value for the 
standardized difference, but Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) call a value of 20 “large”. 
Table 3 shows the standardized differences before and after matching for important 
covariates as well as the maximum of the standardized differences and the share of them 
which are bigger than 5. For both regions there is only one variable which has a standardized 
difference after matching of above 20. These are the dummies for labor market districts 
where the number of assignments is very small. For about 90 percent of the variables the 
standardized difference is smaller than 5. The results show that a good balancing of the 
covariates was achieved in comparison to other studies. 
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Before 
matching
After 
matching
Before 
matching
After 
matching
age (years) 54.5 6.41 64.35 3.53
foreign 5.30 0.32 8.82 2.41
female 1.57 0.00 11.84 0.00
married 25.12 1.60 35.14 1.63
CSE 6.74 0.75 0.89 5.62
O-levels 15.40 2.30 4.85 4.56
adv. Technical college entrance 5.75 5.60 0.35 1.70
A-levels 4.62 6.18 4.36 5.32
on-the-job vocational training 11.64 1.53 7.06 1.77
classroom vocational training 8.89 0.70 28.23 1.81
technical college 0.04 3.08 6.43 4.24
university 8.53 3.44 5.57 4.68
polytechnic 3.62 3.65 4.02 3.69
existing professional experience in 
desired occupation 16.53 4.01 30.43 4.88
duration of unemployment until issue 
(days) 28.90 0.72 30.89 0.51
maximum of standardized differences
share of standardized differences > 5 9.85 %10.80 %
21.2229325.01175
Table 3: Balancing test: standardized differences before and after matching for selected 
covariates, summary statistics
West East
general socio-demographic attributes
schooling
vocational training
information about working history (short time)
summary statistics for all covariates
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
6.3 Individual effects of contracting out 
The outcome variables are the labor market states regular employment, subsidized 
employment and unemployment. Figure 3 presents the share of the assigned individuals and 
of the control groups that were in regular employment 12 months before and 9 months after 
the treatment date. Whereas the employment shares before the treatment are balanced by the 
propensity score matching, the employment share for the unemployed individuals assigned 
to a private provider is smaller than that of the control group in the months after the 
treatment. The difference between the two shares can be interpreted as the estimated direct 
treatment effect (ATT) of the assignments. The estimated standard errors presented in Table 
A2 of the Appendix show that the effects are significant for some months after the treatment. 
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Figure 3: Average effect of assignment (complete placements activities) on the assigned individuals 
(assignments in the first quarter of 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
So the ATT of the assignments is negative in eastern and western Germany. It is largest after 
two months (2.6 and 2.3 percentage points) and then diminishes. The results are in line with 
the usual assignment period of three months. Apparently the private providers were on 
average less successful than the public employment offices in placing unemployed 
individuals. 
The results for the other two labor market states is shown in Table A2 in the appendix. The 
effect on unemployment is even stronger than that on regular employment: up to 7.1 
percentage points after 3 months in eastern Germany (western Germany: 5.9). But this effect 
also starts to vanish after the assignment period.15 The conclusion is that the assignments of 
unemployed individuals to private providers in the first quarter of 2004 had on average 
negative short-term effects on these individuals and no long-term effects. These results are 
confirmed by an analysis for a broader sample including the assignments in the first half of 
2004 (Winterhager, 2006). The ineffectiveness of the contracting out scheme can be 
explained by the deficits in the contract management identified as a result of the theoretical 
considerations in Section 2. The design of the tender allowed providers who combined low 
                                                 
15  Calculating the residual of the three labor market states observed here shows that there must be a small 
negative effect on the residual states. These are participation in training programs, out of the labor force and 
self employment.  
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quality with a low price to be awarded the contracts. Information mechanisms did not seem 
to be effective and the incentive effect of the premiums was rather small. 
The results presented so far are averages for all the unemployed individuals assigned to a 
private contractor. It is of interest here whether these effects are the same for different 
sociodemographic groups or if there are particularities. Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix 
present the effects on regular employment for genders and three age groups separately. In 
western Germany, the effects are better for women: the effect becomes positive after 5 
months. Regarding age, the assignments appear to be somewhat more advantageous (or less 
disadvantageous) for unemployed persons older than 50 years.  
6.4 Estimated effects and the design of the tender  
As discussed in Section 2, there are different compensation schemes for the private 
providers. Whereas contracts signed before 2004 were not subject to a standardized 
compensation scheme, there were three types of compensation depending on the previous 
duration of unemployment for contracts in 2004: performance based payment only (less than 
6 months of unemployment), performance based payment plus a 15 percent lump sum (6 to 
12 months) and performance based payment plus a 25 percent lump sum (more than a year). 
The actual amount of the compensation depends on the result of the tender. 
Possible connections between compensation amount and treatment effect have been 
discussed in the theoretical part of Section 2. It was argued that a higher performance based 
payment should lead to increased efforts on the part of the private provider and thus to a 
bigger treatment effect. The empirical relationship is presented in Figures 4 and 5. This 
analysis is presented for the larger sample with assignments from January to June 2004 to 
have more variation in the amount of the premium. The figures show the treatment effects 
for assignments into the three standardized and the non-standardized contracts. For each 
contract type (including the non-standardized contracts of 2003) the effects are differentiated 
according to the amount of the payment in case of successful placement: less than 200 Euro, 
between 200 and 400 Euro and more than 400 Euro. Even though the picture is not 
completely unambiguous, there seems to be a positive correlation between amount of the 
premium and treatment effect. The effects of the assignments after six months with premium 
of more than 400 Euro rank highest in five cases and lowest in only one case. 
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Figure 4: Average effect of assignments (complete placements activities) for the assigned individuals 
in different types of assignments with different amounts of premium (assignments in the first half of 
2004 in western Germany), number of cases in brackets in the legend 
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Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
This correlation between the amount of the premium and the estimated treatment effect does 
not have a causal interpretation. To establish such a relationship, one would first have to 
control for individual and regional characteristics which imply different treatment effects as 
shown in the last section. This is done here by an OLS regression of the “individual 
treatment effect” (i.e. for each treated individual, the difference in the outcome variable 
between his own outcome and the outcome for his control person) on all the characteristics 
also used in the propensity score estimation plus the amount of the premium contracted for 
this individual. Table 4 shows that for eastern Germany the positive coefficient is significant. 
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Figure 5: Average effect of assignments (complete placements activities) for the assigned individuals 
in different types of assignments with different amounts of premium (assignments in the first half of 
2004 in eastern Germany), number of cases in brackets in the legend 
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Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
However, this regression poses the problem that the premium is endogenously determined in 
the tender, so the coefficient is biased. If for unemployed persons with lower expected 
treatment effects higher premiums are contracted, the coefficient is biased downward. To 
control for this one would need an instrumental variable which is partially correlated to the 
amount of the premium but not directly correlated to the estimated treatment effect. One 
might think of using data about the tender, like the number of offers submitted in the labor 
market district relative to the number of contracts, which would indicate the market 
tightness. Unfortunately, such data are not available for the introductory period in 2004, 
although they might be for later tenders. 
Altogether, it does not seem to be possible to establish a causal relationship between the 
amount of the premium and the estimated treatment effect for 2004. It might be possible in 
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the future and would certainly be very useful, because the premium is an important 
parameter of the instrument. 
coefficient standard error t-value
West
amount of the premium 0,0011% 0,0009% 1,18
Ost 
amount of the premium 0,0048% 0,0012% 3,86
Table 4: Regression of the "individual" treatment effect on the individual characteristics 
and the amount of the premium; coefficients of the amount of the premium  
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
7 Conclusions 
Contracting out might be a tool to make placement services for unemployed individuals 
more effective and efficient and thereby reduce frictional unemployment. It is regulated by § 
37 SGB III in Germany, which was introduced in 2002. Contracts were standardized at the 
beginning of 2004. After going into some theoretical considerations based on new 
institutional economics, this paper analyzes the use of this instrument and its effectiveness 
from the perspective of the unemployed individuals assigned to a private provider for the 
complete placement activities. It also takes a closer look at the connection between the 
compensation and the estimated treatment effects. 
Contracting out was not widely used in 2004. Only 8 percent of the people who registered as 
unemployed from January to September 2004, or 250.000 jobseekers, were assigned to a 
private provider for complete placement activities during that time. The total costs of the 
assignments for complete placement activities were less than 70 million € for 2004. On 
average, it tends to be the jobseekers with better employment opportunities who are assigned 
to the private providers. 
Treatment is defined as the first approach to the private provider after the assignment during 
the first quarter of 2004. The outcomes, regular employment, subsidized employment and 
unemployment can be observed for nine months up to December 2004. The selectivity of the 
assignments is taken into account in the microeconometric evaluation study that uses 
propensity score matching to solve the evaluation problem. The plausibility of the 
identifying matching assumptions is discussed. It is argued that they hold, i.e. the matched 
control group is a reliable proxy for the unobserved counterfactual. The CIA should hold 
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because the highly informative administrative data provided by the Federal Employment 
Agency minimizes selection on unobservables. Unobserved heterogeneity is small enough to 
get a negligible bias. The common support is given because assignment to the providers is 
not deterministic conditional on observable characteristics, but varies due to differing 
attitudes towards the instrument. 
The estimated effect of the assignments on the probability of employment is small and 
negative: 2.3 to 2.6 percentage points after 2 months. The positive effects on the probability 
of unemployment are even bigger, up to 7 percentage points. The effects are only temporary, 
vanishing after some months. This is in line with the assignment duration of three months. 
On average, the private providers were less successful in placing their clients than the public 
employment offices at the beginning of 2004. The theoretical analysis hints at the possible 
reasons: there were important deficits in the contract management for the contracting out at 
that time. The design of the tender allowed providers who combined low quality with a low 
price to be awarded the contracts. Information mechanisms did not seem to be effective and 
the incentive effect of the premiums was rather small. 
The results show a positive relationship between the amount of the premium and the 
estimated treatment effect, as one would expect from a theoretical perspective: a higher 
premium implies a larger incentive for the private provider to invest into placement 
activities. However, establishing a causal relationship is problematic because an instrumental 
variable for the premium is not available for 2004. 
The results of this microeconometric evaluation suggest that there should be modifications in 
the contracting out of placement services relative to the 2004 design. Given the theoretical 
considerations and the empirical evidence, the design of the tender and the compensation 
scheme should be taken as a starting point for these changes. An econometric evaluation of 
such changes will provide additional insight into the connection between contract 
management and treatment effects. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Average effect of assignments (complete placements activities) for the assigned 
individuals by gender (assignments in the first quarter of 2004) 
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
 
Figure A2: Average effect of assignments (complete placements activities) for the assigned 
individuals by age group (assignments in the first quarter of 2004) 
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
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Table A1: Probit estimation of the Propensity Score, number of covariates incomplete  
  
  West East 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1591 0.1558 
 Variable 
Coefficient 
(marginal 
effect) 
z 
Coefficient 
(marginal 
effect) 
z 
General socio-demographic attributes 
Age (Spline function)         
Age 0 -0.00075 -21.72 -0.00166 -19.59 
Age 25 -0.00067 -18.94 -0.00133 -15.93 
Age 30 0.00013 3.68 0.00029 3.42 
Age 35 -0.00002 -0.64 -0.00021 -2.79 
Age 40 0.00001 0.34 -0.00019 -2.64 
Age 45 -0.00008 -2.06 -0.00023 -3.00 
Age 50 -0.00046 -10.12 -0.00056 -6.10 
Age 55 -0.00198 -16.07 -0.00273 -11.54 
Age 60 0.00095 2.89 0.00055 0.56 
Foreign -0.00028 -2.99 -0.00275 -4.31 
Female 0.00042 3.92 0.00106 3.96 
Single reference 
Partnership, not married 0.00004 0.20 0.00038 1.16 
Single parent 0.00076 1.75 -0.00087 -1.04 
Married 0.00022 2.08 0.00012 0.48 
Female * (partnership, not 
married) -0.00015 -0.50 -0.00169 -3.74 
Female * (single parent) -0.00043 -1.05 -0.00008 -0.08 
Female * (married) -0.00078 -5.52 -0.00147 -4.67 
Children 0-3 years (dummy) -0.00002 -0.14 -0.00103 -3.16 
Children 3-7 years (dummy) 0.00001 0.06 -0.00053 -1.70 
Children 7-14 years (dummy) 0.00008 0.61 -0.00045 -1.70 
Qualification 
Professional training: 
No professional training reference 
on-the-job vocational training 0.00018 1.03 0.00220 5.93 
classroom vocational training 0.00230 5.84 0.00488 8.54 
technical college 0.00038 1.01 0.00442 3.85 
university -0.00144 -3.19 -0.00198 -1.37 
polytechnic -0.00139 -2.42 -0.00068 -0.41 
experience in preferred job 
according to the assessment of 
caseworker (dummy) -0.00031 -2.10 0.00073 1.85 
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Table A1, continued 
Interaction of experience and professional training: 
Exp. * on-the-job vocational 
training 0.00065 0.36 -0.00126 -2.81 
Exp. * classroom vocational 
training -0.00037 -1.02 -0.00142 -2.52 
Exp. * technical college -0.00012 -0.30 -0.00264 -3.09 
Exp. * university 0.00183 2.95 0.00432 2.12 
Exp. * polytechnic 0.00215 2.57 0.00157 0.79 
Qualification level as seen by the caseworker: 
unskilled employee reference 
skilled employee 0.00029 3.06 0.00042 2.39 
Technical school level 0.00062 2.57 0.00024 0.41 
Polytechnic level -0.00079 -2.53 0.00150 1.76 
top executive or university level -0.00135 -4.62 0.00229 2.47 
others  0.00028 0.80 0.00310 3.61 
Change of industry -0.00024 -3.62 0.00040 2.38 
Last contact with labor market 
Daily wage in last employment (€): 
no previous wage  reference 
above 0, up to 20 -0.00011 -0.80 0.00058 1.97 
above 20, up to 40 0.00011 1.04 0.00060 3.26 
above 40, up to 60 0.00015 1.51 -0.00012 -0.61 
above 60, up to 80 -0.00011 -0.96 0.00022 0.59 
above 80, up to 100 -0.00025 -1.50 0.00094 1.36 
above 100 -0.00052 -2.73 -0.00094 -1.10 
Reason for end of previous employment 
dismissal 0.00011 1.15 -0.00041 -1.66 
Fixed-term contract 0.00038 3.34 0.00004 0.15 
Other reason  reference 
Daily amount of unemployment benefits / assistance (€) 
no benefit / assistance reference 
above 0, up to 10 0.00287 12.36 0.00636 11.69 
above 10, up to 15 0.00339 16.29 0.00633 12.90 
above 15, up to 20 0.00352 18.33 0.00686 14.67 
above 20, up to 25 0.00409 20.29 0.00839 16.14 
above 25, up to 30 0.00395 17.72 0.00961 14.64 
above 30, up to 40 0.00361 15.72 0.00879 11.60 
above 40 0.00268 9.68 0.00640 5.38 
The following covariates are not included in the table: dummies for disabilities and health problems (5), 
secondary school qualifications (4), favored occupational field (20), preferred working time (4), long term labor 
market history (96), labor market districts (34 for eastern and 146 for western Germany), spline function for 
duration of previous unemployment (25). 
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
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month after treatment ATT
standard 
error ATT
standard 
error ATT
standard 
error
1 -2.20 % 0.21 % -0.73 % 0.10 % 4.78 % 0.29 %
2 -2.25 % 0.29 % -0.65 % 0.13 % 5.65 % 0.37 %
3 -1.93 % 0.33 % -0.59 % 0.16 % 5.94 % 0.41 %
4 -1.43 % 0.35 % -0.28 % 0.18 % 5.11 % 0.43 %
5 -0.61 % 0.36 % -0.13 % 0.19 % 4.03 % 0.44 %
6 -0.25 % 0.37 % -0.10 % 0.20 % 2.98 % 0.45 %
7 0.42 % 0.38 % -0.41 % 0.20 % 2.36 % 0.45 %
8 0.75 % 0.38 % 0.37 % 0.20 % 1.47 % 0.45 %
9 1.28 % 0.38 % 0.48 % 0.20 % 0.66 % 0.44 %
month after treatment ATT
standard 
error ATT
standard 
error ATT
standard 
error
1 -1.63 % 0.24 % -1.34 % 0.17 % 4.56 % 0.35 %
2 -2.64 % 0.34 % -1.54 % 0.21 % 6.52 % 0.46 %
3 -2.56 % 0.39 % -1.43 % 0.24 % 7.11 % 0.52 %
4 -2.05 % 0.42 % -1.39 % 0.27 % 6.50 % 0.55 %
5 -1.81 % 0.44 % -1.27 % 0.29 % 5.89 % 0.56 %
6 -0.97 % 0.46 % -1.05 % 0.30 % 4.91 % 0.57 %
7 -1.01 % 0.47 % -0.16 % 0.31 % 3.75 % 0.58 %
8 -0.48 % 0.47 % 0.21 % 0.31 % 2.67 % 0.59 %
9 -0.30 % 0.46 % 0.63 % 0.30 % 1.46 % 0.59 %
Table A2: ATT with standard errors in the 9 months after the assignment date (assignments from January 
to March 2004), labor market states: regular employment, subsidized employment and unemployment
Eastern Germany
unemploymentsubsidized employmentregular employment
Western Germany
regular employment subsidized employment unemployment
 
Source: own calculations using data from the Federal Employment Office, see text 
 
 
